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I. INTRODUCTION 
In 1996, Congress passed the Antiterrorism and Effective Death 
Penalty Act (AEDPA or “the Act”).
1
  As the Supreme Court noted, 
AEDPA’s purpose was “to reduce delays in the execution of state and 
federal criminal sentences, particularly in capital cases.”
2
  Thus, the 
Act sought “to prevent ‘retrials’ on federal habeas and to give effect 
to state convictions to the extent possible under law” in an effort to 
advance the “principles of comity, finality, and federalism.”
3
  In sum, 
Congress attempted to curb what it deemed as an abuse by convicted 
prisoners of the extensive appeals process in the United States court 
system at that time.
4
  From its inception, scholars have recognized 
that the Act has indeed greatly limited the access of convicted state 
prisoners to the federal habeas system.
5
 
 
 ∗ J.D., May 2011, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A., 2007, The College of 
William & Mary.  Thanks to Professor John Cornwell for his guidance and to Sarah 
Geers for her comments and assistance. 
 1 Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2006)). 
 2 Woodford v. Visciotti, 538 U.S. 202, 206 (2003). 
 3 Id. at 206 (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 386 (2000)). 
 4 See H.R. REP. NO. 104-518, at 111 (1996) (Conf. Rep.).  Some scholars, howev-
er, have suggested that Congress adopted AEDPA more for political reasons than be-
cause of any concern for federalism or the efficiency of the judicial process.  See, e.g., 
Bryan A. Stevenson, The Politics of Fear and Death: Successive Problems in Capital Federal 
Habeas Cases, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 699, 701 (2002) (“AEDPA was drafted, enacted, and 
signed in an atmosphere of fear. The legislation, which includes substantial cutbacks 
in the federal habeas corpus remedy, was Congress’s response to the tragedy of the 
Oklahoma City bombing.”). 
 5 See, e.g., James O. Nygard, Current Developments in the Law: A Survey of Cases Af-
fecting the Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 6 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 333, 
338 (1996) (“The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 limits the 
Court’s power to review petitions for writs of habeas corpus.”); Tung Yin, A Better 
Mousetrap: Procedural Default as a Retroactivity Alternative to Teague v. Lane and the Anti-
terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 25 AM. J. CRIM. L. 203, 206 (1998) (“The 
Act limits the scope of federal habeas review, wherein the state has rendered a deci-
sion on the merits on the claim, to determining whether that decision ‘was contrary 
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Prior to AEDPA, federal habeas corpus courts reviewed “the peti-
tioner’s legal claims de novo in the strictest sense of that term.”
6
  With 
respect to “questions of law or mixed questions of law and fact, the 
federal courts treated the petition as a wholly new complaint, which 
originated ‘an independent civil suit’ and deserved to be adjudicated 
‘from scratch.’”
7
  AEDPA changed these norms in a number of ways.  
Perhaps the most significant alteration was § 2254(d)(1).  The sta-
tute, in pertinent part, states the following: 
(d) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a per-
son in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not 
be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the 
merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the 
claim— 
 (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an un-
reasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as deter-
mined by the Supreme Court of the United States.
8
 
First, note that the statute, by its terms, applies only to state-prisoner 
habeas corpus petitions.
9
  As the provision suggests, the threshold 
question is whether a claim has been “adjudicated on the merits” at 
the state court level.
10
  Yet even if this requirement is satisfied, the pe-
titioner may not simply assert any and all issues that he or she has 
with the state court decision.  To the contrary, for a federal court to 
grant the writ of habeas corpus under § 2254(d)(1), a petitioner must 
demonstrate that the state court decision was inconsistent with feder-
al law.
11
 
In the determination of this latter point, AEDPA drastically 
changed the preexisting habeas corpus process.  The statute provides 
two requirements for establishing a reversible federal-law error.  First, 
a federal court may only review federal-law claims, which the provi-
sion limits to “clearly established” precedents of the “Supreme Court 
of the United States.”
12
  Because federal courts formerly had a much 
broader body of law from which to draw when making decisions,
13
 
 
to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as de-
termined by the Supreme Court of the United States.’”). 
 6 2 RANDY HERTZ & JAMES S. LIEBMAN, FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE § 32.1 (5th ed. 2005). 
 7 Id. 
 8 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2006) (emphasis added). 
 9 HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note 6, § 32.1. 
 10 § 2254(d). 
 11 § 2254(d)(1). 
 12 Id. 
 13 HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note 6, § 32.1 
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Congress effectually reduced the potential grounds for habeas review.  
Second, the provision requires that a state decision be “contrary to, 
or involve[] an unreasonable application of” that clearly established 
law before a court may grant a habeas petition.
14
  Thus, in addition to 
limiting the potential grounds for habeas review, Congress also al-
tered the de novo standard of review of federal legal claims that ex-
isted prior to AEDPA.  By restricting the reviewable “federal law” and 
adopting the more stringent “contrary to” and “unreasonable appli-
cation” language, AEDPA radically diminished the scope of federal 
review. 
After years of difficulty for the circuit courts in interpreting § 
2254(d)(1),
15
 in 2000 the Supreme Court issued a definitive state-
ment in Williams v. Taylor,
16
 which continues to be the governing law 
today.  Essentially, Williams established that the “contrary to” and 
“unreasonable application” language in the statute formulated two 
different tests within the standard even though they are contained in 
the same sentence.
17
  A decision is “contrary to” federal law when a 
state court applies the wrong federal law entirely.
18
  By contrast, a 
state court unreasonably applies federal law when its application of 
the correct precedent is “objectively unreasonable.”
19
  The “contrary 
to” test is typically, but not always, uncontroversial, because state 
courts usually will at least identify the correct federal law to apply.
20
  
Thus, the focus of this Comment is the “unreasonable application” 
test.  Here, the Williams Court established its lasting legacy by insist-
ing that an incorrect or erroneous application of federal law is different 
 
Until 1989 . . . federal courts could adjudicate the prisoner’s “com-
plaint” on the basis of legal principles that were not even in existence 
at the time the state ruled.  And until AEDPA was passed, federal courts 
could adjudicate the complaint on the basis of legal principles that had 
never become binding on state courts, i.e., on the basis of federal cir-
cuit law developed in the absence of any controlling Supreme Court 
law on point.   
Id. 
 14 Id. 
 15 See infra note 64. 
 16 529 U.S. 362 (2000). 
 17 Id. at 404–05.   
 18 See id. at 405–06. 
 19 Id. at 409.   
 20 An example of how the “contrary to” test operates can be found in Williams it-
self.  Justice O’Connor held that the Virginia Supreme Court’s decision was “contrary 
to” clearly established federal law because the state court applied Lockhart v. Fretwell, 
506 U.S. 364 (1993), instead of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).  Wil-
liams, 529 U.S. at 413–14 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
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from an objectively unreasonable application of that law.
21
  Accordingly, 
Williams cemented a notion that had existed, albeit tenuously, since 
the adoption of AEDPA: even if a federal court believes in its inde-
pendent judgment that a state-court decision applied federal law in-
correctly, it must deny a petition for habeas corpus so long as the de-
cision was “objectively reasonable.”
22
 
The interpretative gap between incorrect and unreasonable has 
been the subject of many Supreme Court decisions since 2000.  Be-
cause this Comment focuses exclusively on the application of § 
2254(d)(1) to capital punishment cases, its analysis is necessarily li-
mited to decisions involving capital sentences.
23
  In this context, the 
results are staggering.  The so-called conservative bloc of the Court, 
which at various times has consisted of Justices Scalia, Rehnquist, 
Thomas, Roberts, and Alito, has found a state-court decision to be an 
“unreasonable application” of federal law in only 4–14% of cases.
24
  
By contrast, Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Stevens—the so-called lib-
eral bloc of the Court—have found the states’ decisions to be an “un-
reasonable application” of the law 53–64% of the time.
25
  A review of 
the Court’s cases interpreting § 2254(d)(1) in the capital context also 
reveals that the decisions in this area are often split five-to-four, with 
the holdings hinging solely on the analyses of Justices Kennedy and 
O’Connor.
26
  The latter two justices have applied a more genuine—
yet entirely undefined—standard in reaching their conclusions.
27
 
A retrospective analysis of the Court’s decisions since Williams v. 
Taylor demonstrates that the two sides of the Court are not merely 
disagreeing over the application of the present standard; they are ac-
tually applying two completely different standards.  The conservative 
bloc, to whom I refer throughout this Comment as the “blind defe-
rence camp,” has blindly deferred to the state court’s interpretation 
of federal law.
28
  On the other hand, the more liberal justices, to 
whom I refer throughout this Comment as the “de novo camp,” have 
 
 21 Id. at 412.   
 22 See infra Part II.B. 
 23 Contrary to what its name suggests, the AEDPA is not exclusively limited to 
capital cases.  For purposes of this Comment—in the interest of clarity and brevity, 
and also because I view the results in capital cases to be particularly troublesome—I 
have elected to restrict my focus accordingly. 
 24 See infra Part IV.A. 
 25 See infra Part IV.A. 
 26 See infra Part V.A. 
 27 See infra Part V.A. 
 28 See infra Part IV.A. 
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applied de novo review akin to what was in place prior to AEDPA.
29
  
This separation between the two blocs is stark and evidences three 
critical problems stemming from the provision as it has been applied 
since Williams v. Taylor. 
First, several cases with similar facts have led to inconsistent re-
sults.  Often split five-to-four, such decisions demonstrate that the 
standard has become arbitrary with results hinging on which camp 
Justices Kennedy and O’Connor aligned with in a particular case.
30
  
The second issue flows from the first: namely, the provision fails to 
provide petitioners with the proper notice of what is required to chal-
lenge a state decision.
31
  Finally, and most importantly, the inconsis-
tent standard is dangerous because the differences in opinion regard-
ing the provision in capital cases result in life-or-death 
consequences.
32
  Given these considerations and the fact that federal 
courts are generally in a better position to evaluate federal law than 
the state courts where these claims originate, the Supreme Court 
should at the very least define the standard by which “reasonableness” 
is to be judged.  Yet it seems that the optimal solution to the current 
dilemma is a congressional revision of the statue creating a new ex-
ception: in capital cases, federal law claims should be reviewed as they 
were prior to AEDPA—de novo.
33
 
Part II of this comment will outline habeas corpus procedure as 
it existed prior to AEDPA, as well as the legislative concerns that led 
to its adoption.  Part III will discuss the Williams v. Taylor standard 
and how it changed the existing interpretations of § 2254(d)(1).  Part 
IV will provide an overview of how the Supreme Court has inter-
preted the provision since 2000 and identify the wide and problemat-
ic split between liberal and conservative justices over the meaning of 
§ 2254(d)(1).  Part V will analyze the three main problems with the 
Court’s split analysis: namely, that the standard has become arbitrary, 
that it fails to provide proper notice, and that it is dangerous in the 
context of life-or-death consequences.  Part VI will propose potential 
solutions and explain why a balancing of the relevant harms weighs in 
favor of altering the statute to provide a de novo standard of review. 
 
 29 See infra Part IV.A. 
 30 See infra Part V.A. 
 31 See infra Part V.B. 
 32 See infra Part V.C. 
 33 Recognizing the unique concerns involved with capital punishment is not un-
precedented.  See, e.g., Death Penalty Is Repealed in New Mexico, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 
2009, at A16 (explaining that fifteen states have now barred the death penalty). 
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II. HABEAS CORPUS PROCEDURE PRIOR TO AEDPA AND LEGISLATIVE 
HISTORY 
A. Habeas Prior to AEDPA 
The writ of habeas corpus derives from English common law.  In 
England, the writ established a system enabling convicted prisoners 
to contest illegal imprisonments.
34
  The United States acknowledged 
the writ in its Constitution, which states that “the writ of habeas cor-
pus shall not be suspended, unless when in cases of rebellion or inva-
sion the public safety may require it.”
35
  In 1867, Congress extended 
the writ of habeas corpus to state prisoners via the Habeas Corpus 
Act; however, the act disallowed claims alleging violations of state law 
and restricted federal habeas to claims stating a federal-law viola-
tion.
36
  Thus, grant of the writ in federal court has always required a 
petitioner to demonstrate that he was being held in “custody in viola-
tion of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.”
37
  
Given this, a federal court will not grant the writ of habeas corpus 
where there has been an error in the application of state law.
38
  Ac-
cordingly, the “vast majority of habeas corpus petitions by state pris-
oners allege a violation of the constitution.”
39
 
As discussed earlier, prior to AEDPA, the courts were permitted 
to find that convicted state prisoners were being held “in violation of 
the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States” where a low-
er court applied federal law incorrectly.
40
  An example of the Supreme 
Court’s application of de novo review to federal law claims prior to 
AEDPA is Burger v. Kemp, where the Court affirmed the denial of a 
writ of habeas corpus to a petitioner claiming ineffective counsel.
41
  In 
that case, a Georgia jury sentenced petitioner Burger to death for 
murder.
42
  Burger claimed that his counsel was ineffective because (1) 
a conflict of interest existed when his counsel’s partners represented 
his co-indictees, and (2) his counsel failed to “develop and present 
 
 34 MARK E. CAMMACK & NORMAN M. GARLAND, ADVANCED CRIMINAL PROCEDURE IN 
A NUTSHELL 483 (2d ed. 2006). 
 35 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2. 
 36 The Habeas Corpus Act of 1867, ch. 28, 14 Stat. 385 (current version at 28 
U.S.C. § 2241); see also CAMMACK & GARLAND, supra note 34, at 483. 
 37 CAMMACK & GARLAND, supra note 34, at 483. 
 38 Id. at 487. 
 39 Id. 
 40 See supra notes 6–7 and accompanying text. 
 41 483 U.S. 776 (1987). 
 42 Id. at 777. 
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mitigating evidence” at the sentencing hearings.
43
  While the Court 
rightly deferred to the lower courts’ factual findings, it applied those 
facts de novo with respect to the federal legal claims.  The Court rea-
soned that the Strickland standard,
44
 as it is laid out, requires defe-
rence to counsel’s decisions.
45
  Then, the majority directly evaluated 
the evidence presented of Burger’s troublesome circumstances and 
came to an independent legal judgment that Burger had not shown 
that, “in light of all the circumstances, the identified acts or omissions 
[of counsel] were outside the wide range of professionally competent 
assistance.”
46
  The Court did not base the holding on the “objective 
reasonability” of the state court’s application of federal law regarding 
ineffective assistance of counsel; rather, the Court simply believed 
that the state court did not apply the Strickland standard incorrectly.  
As Burger v. Kemp illustrates, federal courts possessed considerable 
flexibility in evaluating federal law claims prior to AEDPA. 
B. Legislative History 
In the wake of the Oklahoma City bombing, some lawmakers 
began to view the flexibility of the habeas corpus law as an enabling 
device for convicted prisoners to delay their sentences.
47
  If courts re-
viewed every claim de novo, they feared, then the extensive appeals 
 
 43 Id. at 788. 
 44 The Strickland standard states the following:  
A convicted defendant’s claim that counsel’s assistance was so defective 
as to require reversal of a conviction or death sentence has two com-
ponents.  First, the defendant must show that counsel’s performance 
was deficient.  This requires showing that counsel made errors so se-
rious that counsel was not functioning as the “counsel” guaranteed the 
defendant by the Sixth Amendment.  Second, the defendant must 
show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.  This re-
quires showing that counsel’s errors were so serious as to deprive the 
defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.  Unless a defen-
dant makes both showings, it cannot be said that the conviction or 
death sentence resulted from a breakdown in the adversary process 
that renders the result unreliable. 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). 
 45 This use of deference should not be confused with the level of review federal 
courts apply to this standard.  In other words, at that time federal courts were re-
quired to review de novo this standard of deference to counsel. 
 46 Burger, 483 U.S. at 795. 
 47 See H.R. REP. NO. 104-518, at 111 (1996) (Conf. Rep.); 142 CONG. REC. S3454, 
3463 (daily ed. April 17, 1996) (statement of Sen. Bradley); see also Stevenson, supra 
note 4, at 704. 
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process in the United States would result in endless “retrials.”
48
  Seek-
ing to finalize punishments and accord proper respect for state deci-
sions, congressional representatives debated the best mechanism to 
accomplish their goals.  Congress, through § 2254(d)(1), ultimately 
decided to restrict the reviewable federal law and heighten the de-
gree of incorrectness required to overturn a state level decision. 
The legislative history of the Act reveals the intentions and con-
cerns of the authors of § 2254(d)(1).
49
  Several members of Congress 
worried that federal courts would interpret the “unreasonable appli-
cation” language as establishing a “wrong-but-reasonable standard.”
50
  
For example, Senator Patrick Moynihan, a critic of the statute, 
warned, “We are about to enact a statute which would hold that con-
stitutional protections do not exist unless they have been unreasona-
bly violated, an idea that would have confounded the framers.  Thus 
we introduce a virus that will surely spread throughout our system of 
laws.”
51
  Senator Edward Kennedy’s concerns were even more 
pointed.  He interpreted the statute as requiring federal courts to 
simply “defer” to state-level decisions.
52
  In short, members of Con-
gress predicted that incorrect applications of federal law would be 
protected behind the shield of “unreasonableness,” which would 
render even some patently wrong decisions unreviewable under ha-
beas procedure.  In this way, some congressional representatives were 
concerned—and as subsequent cases would show, rightly con-
cerned—that AEDPA “would prevent federal courts from granting 
habeas petitions when a state court decision was wrong as a matter of 
federal law, but nonetheless reasonable (under some undisclosed 
construction of that term).”
53
  This last point indicates that it was not 
 
 48 See H.R. REP. NO. 104-518, at 111 (1996) (Conf. Rep.); 142 CONG. REC. S3454, 
3463 (daily ed. April 17, 1996) (statement of Sen. Bradley); see also Stevenson, supra 
note 4, at 704. 
 49 As an aside, the Bill passed 91–8–1 in the Senate and 293–133–7 in the House 
of Representatives.  142 CONG. REC. S3454 (daily ed. April 17, 1996); 142 CONG. REC. 
H3618 (daily ed. April 18, 1996). 
 50 See infra notes 51–57 and accompanying text; see also Allan Ides, Habeas Stan-
dards of Review Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1): A Commentary on Statutory Text and Su-
preme Court Precedent, 60 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 677, 693 (2003). 
 51 142 CONG. REC. S3438 (daily ed. April 17, 1996) (statement of Sen. Moynihan); 
see also Ides, supra note 50, at 693 n.29. 
 52 142 CONG. REC. S3458 (daily ed. April 17, 1996) (statement of Sen. Kennedy) 
(“[T]he proposal would unwisely require Federal courts to defer to State courts on 
issues of Federal constitutional law.  A Federal court could not grant a writ habeas 
corpus based on Federal constitutional claims, unless the State court’s judgment was 
‘an unreasonable application of Federal law.’”).  
 53 Ides, supra note 50, at 693. 
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only the standard of “reasonableness” that troubled critics, but the 
potential danger arising from the fact that the standard was “unde-
fined.” 
Even the supporters of AEDPA spurned a wrong-but-reasonable 
interpretation of § 2254(d)(1).
54
  For example, Senator Joseph Biden 
identified the potential difficulties implicated by a “wrong-but-
reasonable” approach: 
[T]he bill seems to allow an exception to the general rule 
[against granting habeas] but one that is likely to be illusory be-
cause a claim can be granted only if the State court’s application 
of Federal law to the facts [is] not merely wrong but unreasona-
ble.  This is an extraordinar[ily] deferential standard to the State 
courts, and I believe it is an  inappropriate one. It puts the Feder-
al courts in the difficult position of evaluating the reasonableness 
of a State court judge rather than simply deciding whether or not 
he correctly applied the law, not whether he did it reasonably.  
You can have a reasonable mistake.  They could reasonably con-
clude that on a constitutional provision, it should not apply, when 
in fact the Supreme Court would rule it must apply.
55
 
Senator Arlen Specter, a cosponsor of the bill, stated that he was “not 
entirely comfortable” with the “unreasonable application” standard 
but he ultimately concluded “that the standard in the bill will allow 
Federal courts sufficient discretion to ensure that convictions in State 
court have been obtained in conformity with the Constitution.”
56
  
Senator Orin Hatch, also a cosponsor of the bill, rebutted concerns 
over the “wrong-but-reasonable” loophole by arguing that the stan-
dard “enables the Federal court to overturn State court positions that 
clearly contravene Federal law.  It further allows the Federal courts to 
review State court decisions that improperly apply clearly established 
Federal law.”
57
  Senator Hatch’s use of the term “improperly” instead 
of “unreasonably” suggests that even he, as a supporter, was using the 
terms interchangeably.  This seems curiously close to equating “in-
correct” with “unreasonable,” an interpretation that the Williams v. 
Taylor decision would later expressly reject.
58
 
 
 54 Id. at 694. 
 55 141 CONG. REC. S7842 (daily ed. June 7, 1995) (statement of Sen. Biden); see 
also Ides, supra note 50, at 694. 
 56 142 CONG. REC. S3472 (daily ed. April 17, 1996) (statement of Sen. Specter); 
see also Ides, supra note 50, at 695. 
 57 141 CONG. REC. S7846 (daily ed. June 7, 1995) (statement of Sen. Hatch) (em-
phasis added); see also Ides, supra note 50, at 695. 
 58 See infra note 79.  Other congressional representatives were even more explicit 
about equating “incorrect” with “unreasonable.”  See, e.g., 142 CONG. REC. S3465 (dai-
ly ed. April, 17, 1996) (statement of Sen. Levin) (“I believe the courts will conclude, 
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Moreover, even President Clinton acknowledged the danger of 
allowing federal courts to defer to state decisions involving federal 
law.  Upon signing the law, the President released the following 
statement: “I have signed this bill because I am confident that the 
Federal courts will interpret these provisions to preserve independent 
review of Federal legal claims and the bedrock constitutional principle 
of an independent judiciary.”
59
  Therefore, as Professor Ides has ar-
gued, “to the extent that the legislative history is informative, it re-
veals some concern that the ‘unreasonable application’ standard of 
review might be read to preclude federal court review of a state court 
decision that could be described as wrong-but-reasonable.”
60
  Yet if § 
2254(d)(1) is unclear regarding “the scope of the review power em-
bodied in the ‘unreasonable application’ principle, the . . . legislative 
history seems to establish . . . that such a radically innovative wrong-
but-reasonable standard has no legitimate place within the sphere of inter-
pretive possibilities.”
61
 
After considering this legislative history, one wonders what these 
same members of Congress would have thought if they could have fo-
reseen the holdings in later cases, such as Woodford v. Visciotti
62
 and 
Early v. Packer.
63
  Both opinions explicitly endorsed the “wrong-but-
reasonable” interpretation of the statute.  While the holdings un-
doubtedly conflict with the aforementioned congressional senti-
ments, Congress has yet to modify the statute to make it absolutely 
clear that such interpretations are incorrect.  The Court is not obli-
 
as they should, that a constitutional error cannot be reasonable and that if a State 
court decision is wrong, it must necessarily be unreasonable.”). 
 59 Statement on Signing the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 
1996, 32 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 719 (April 26, 1996) (emphasis added), available 
at http://clinton6.nara.gov/1996/04/1996-04-24-president-statement-on-
antiterrorism-bill-signing.html.  
 60 See Ides, infra note 50, at 697. 
 61 Id. (emphasis added). 
 62 537 U.S. 19 (2002).  The Court reversed a grant of habeas relief in a per cu-
riam decision.  Id. at 20.  The majority held that even if the state court was wrong, it 
is not enough to convince a federal habeas court that, in its independent judgment, 
the state-court decision applied Strickland incorrectly.  Id. at 27.  Note that while this 
per curiam decision appears lopsided, it is only because the case involved a denial of 
habeas corpus rights.  When the independent judgment of the rest of the Court 
aligns with the conservative bloc’s blind deference to the state court, lopsided results 
will sometimes emerge.  This, however, is not proof that the different sects of the 
court are applying the same standard.  
 63 537 U.S. 3 (2002).  The Court reversed a grant of habeas relief in a per curiam 
decision.  Id. at 4.  Even if the Court agreed with the Ninth Circuit majority that 
there was jury coercion here, the Court stated that “it is at least reasonable to con-
clude that there was not, which means that the state court’s determination to that 
effect must stand.”  Id. at 11. 
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gated to follow the legislative history of an Act of Congress; rather, 
the Court is required to apply its interpretation of the statute as writ-
ten.  Thus, if Congress disagrees with decisions interpreting § 
2254(d)(1) as allowing a wrong-but-reasonable standard of review, it 
has a responsibility to amend the statute to correct such a misapplica-
tion.  Instead, Congress remains silent. 
III. THE WILLIAMS V. TAYLOR INTERPRETATION OF § 2254(D)(1) 
Prior to 2000, the circuit courts disagreed over the proper appli-
cation of the “contrary to” and “unreasonable application” language 
of § 2254(d)(1).
64
  In Williams v. Taylor, 
65
 a shifting majority of the 
Court construed § 2254(d)(1), and the Court’s interpretation of the 
statute remains good law today.  The majority granted the petition for 
habeas corpus and held that the state court’s decision that defen-
dant’s counsel was effective was both “contrary to” and an “unreason-
able application of” the Supreme Court’s decisions interpreting the 
Sixth Amendment.
66
  In Williams, the Court identified its decision in 
 
 64 Hertz & Liebman described the circuit split as follows: 
Three circuits—the 5th, 7th, and 11th—treated Congress’ bifurcation 
of section 2254(d)(1) as signaling an intention to apply the ‘contrary 
to . . . law’ clause to questions of law and the (in their view) extremely 
deferential ‘unreasonable application of . . . law’ clause to mixed ques-
tions of law and fact.  The 1st, 3d, and 8th Circuits viewed the two 
clauses of section 2254(d)(1) as calling for a two-step inquiry, in which 
the reviewing court first determined whether the Supreme Court had 
already developed a legal standard to ‘govern’ claims of the sort raised 
in the habeas corpus application; cases coming within such a standard 
were subject to the ‘contrary to . . . law’ clause, leaving other cases sub-
ject to the ‘unreasonable application . . . of law’ clause.  The 4th Circuit 
employed an approach similar to that of the 1st, 3d, and 8th Circuits 
but diverged from those circuits by applying more restrictive criteria 
for gauging the existence of a ‘governing’ precedent and for assessing 
whether an application of law was ‘unreasonable.’  Attempting to navi-
gate between these various approaches, the 6th Circuit deemed one 
formulation (the 1st Circuit’s) to be the measure of an aggregate of 
two other formulations (the 4th and 5th Circuits’).  The remaining 
four circuits . . . did not adopt a definitive construction of the statute, 
allowing individual panels to apply apparently inconsistent standards. 
HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note 6, at § 32.3. 
 65 529 U.S. 362 (2000).  The decision was six-to-three, with Justice O’Connor and 
Justice Stevens authoring separate sections that comprised the opinion of the Court.  
Id. at 367, 399.  With regard to the result, Justices O’Connor, Kennedy, Ginsburg, 
Breyer, Souter, and Stevens reversed the denial of the petition.  Id.  Justices Scalia, 
Rehnquist, and Thomas comprised the dissent and concluded that the denial of the 
petition was proper. Id. at 416 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).  
 66 Id. at 413 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
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Strickland
67
 as the “clearly established federal law” and contended that 
the state court’s finding with respect to the counsel’s failure to 
present adequate mitigating evidence of defendant’s background and 
abuse as a child was “objectively unreasonable.”
68
 
More important than its particular facts, however, is Williams’s 
discussion of the “contrary to” and “unreasonable application” tests 
of § 2254(d)(1).  With respect to these issues, Justice O’Connor’s 
analysis is the governing opinion.
69
  First, Justice O’Connor’s con-
struction provided that a state court decision is “contrary to . . . clear-
ly established Supreme Court . . . law” under § 2254(d)(1) if the 
“state court’s decision . . . is substantially different from the relevant 
precedent of the Supreme Court.”
70
  Justice O’Connor then pro-
ceeded to identify two ways in which a state court decision can be 
“contrary to” or “substantially different from” Supreme Court 
precedent.
71
  First, a “state-court decision will certainly be contrary to 
[the Court’s] clearly established precedent if the state court applies a 
rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [the Court’s] cas-
es.”
72
  Second, a “state-court decision will also be contrary to this 
Court’s clearly established precedent if the state court confronts a set 
of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of this 
Court and nevertheless arrives at a result different from [the Court’s] 
precedent.”
73
 
Justice O’Connor continued, in accordance with her interpreta-
tion, to give separate consideration to the “unreasonable application” 
test of § 2254(d)(1).
74
  She contended that a “state-court decision that 
correctly identifies the governing legal rule but applies it unreasona-
bly to the facts of a particular prisoner’s case certainly would qualify 
as a decision ‘involving an unreasonable application of . . . clearly es-
tablished Federal law.’”
75
  In what has become the crux of the debate 
over § 2254(d)(1) since Williams, the Court concluded that a “federal 
habeas court making the ‘unreasonable application’ inquiry should 
ask whether the state court’s application of clearly established federal 
 
 67 See supra note 44 for a discussion of the Strickland standard for ineffective assis-
tance of counsel. 
 68 Williams, 529 U.S. at 413 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 69 Id. at 401–13. 
 70 Id. at 405. 
 71 Id. at 405–06. 
 72 Id. at 405. 
 73 Id. at 406. 
 74 Williams, 529 U.S. at 407–08. 
 75 Id. 
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law was objectively unreasonable.”
76
  The difficulties that would even-
tually arise from this “objective unreasonableness” standard were 
compounded by the fact that the Court did not in any way define the 
term or provide a test by which to measure “objective reasonable-
ness.”
77
  Instead, the majority adopted an interpretation that Congress 
had repudiated
78
 when it held that, “for purposes of today’s opinion, 
the most important point is that an unreasonable application of fed-
eral law is different from an incorrect application of federal law” and 
that “a federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because 
that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant 
state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneous-
ly or incorrectly.  Rather, that application must also be unreasona-
ble.”
79
 
In his portion of the majority opinion, Justice Stevens provided 
the framework by which courts should evaluate petitions governed by 
§ 2254 (d)(1).
80
  Justice Stevens noted that the first issue for a federal 
habeas court is to determine the “clearly established” Supreme Court 
precedent applicable to the relevant petition.
81
  The next question is 
whether the state court’s proclamation of federal law—and not its 
application—is contrary to this Supreme Court precedent.
82
  Finally, 
Justice Stevens stated that the federal courts should determine 
whether the state court “unreasonably” applied the relevant Supreme 
Court precedent.
83
  Although Williams finally established a definitive 
standard by which to evaluate § 2254(d)(1), the ambiguity within that 
standard has created severe flaws in the federal habeas system. 
 
 76 Id. at 409. 
 77 The Second Circuit noted the dilemma.  See Francis S. v. Stone, 221 F.3d 100, 
111 (2d Cir. 2000) (“Some increment of incorrectness beyond error is required . . . . 
[T]he increment need not be great; otherwise, habeas relief would be limited to state 
court decisions ‘so far off the mark as to suggest judicial incompetence.’  We do not 
believe AEDPA restricted federal habeas corpus to that extent.”). 
 78 See supra Part II.B. 
 79 Williams, 529 U.S. at 411 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (emphasis added). 
 80 Id. at 391 (majority opinion). 
 81 Id. at 379. 
 82 Id. 
 83 Id. 
MCGRADY_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 11/22/2011  9:07 AM 
1612 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41:1599 
IV. THE PROBLEMATIC SPLIT STANDARD EMERGING FROM WILLIAMS 
SINCE 2000 
A. The Empirical Results 
The focus of this Comment is an empirical study and analysis of 
the Court’s application of § 2254(d)(1) since Williams.
84
  Of the twen-
ty-two cases applying the § 2254(d)(1) standard since then, fifteen 
petitions were denied—the Court either affirmed a lower court deci-
sion to deny the writ or reversed a lower court’s grant of the writ.
85
  At 
first glance, this result is not surprising; in fact, the numbers align 
with the expectations.  The standard of review requires respect for 
decisions at the state level while obliging the Court to exercise inde-
pendent judgment to overturn “unreasonable” results.  Given this, a 
50–50 split would suggest that the Court has not shown enough defe-
rence and has merely applied something akin to de novo review.  On 
the other hand, a 100% denial of the writ would imply that the Court 
was blindly deferring to the state. 
TABLE 1.   
Empirical Analysis of the Supreme Court’s § 2254(d)(1) Decisions Since 
Williams 
±Majority Opinion 
•Concurring Opinion 
• Dissenting Opinion 
 
Case Grant Deny Justices Favoring Grant Justices Favoring Denial 
Williams v. Taylor
86
 X  
Stevens ±, Souter, Gin-
burg, Breyer, O’Connor •, 
Kennedy 
Scalia, Rehnquist •,  
Thomas 
 
 84 The following study represents the twenty-two cases decided by the Supreme 
Court since the Williams decision in 2000 in which the Court has applied the “unrea-
sonable application” test of § 2254(d)(1) in a capital punishment context.  Although 
the analysis is restricted to capital cases, it includes one non-capital case because its 
reasoning has been particularly influential in several of the capital cases.  Through-
out the Comment, I will refer to the twenty-two cases collectively as “capital” for brev-
ity.  In addition, the analysis only focuses on the application of § 2254(d)(1); deci-
sions hinging on other parts of AEDPA are not within the scope of this Comment.  
The cutoff date for this analysis was February 10, 2010. 
 85 See infra Table 1. 
 86 529 U.S. 362 (2000). 
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Case Grant Deny Justices Favoring Grant Justices Favoring Denial 
Ramdass v. Angelone
87
  X 
Stevens •, Souter,  
Ginburg, Breyer 
Scalia, Rehnquist,  
Thomas, O’Connor •, 
Kennedy ± 
Penry v. Johnson
88
 X  
Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, 
Breyer, O’Connor ±,  
Kennedy 
Scalia, Rehnquist,  
Thomas • 
Woodford v. Visciotti
89
  X 
 Per Curiam 
Early v. Packer
90
  X 
 Per Curiam 
Bell v. Cone
91
  X 
Stevens • Scalia, Rehnquist ±,  
Thomas, Souter,  
Ginsburg, Breyer, 
O’Connor, Kennedy 
Wiggins v. Smith
92
 X  
Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, 
Breyer, O’Connor ±,  
Kennedy, Rehnquist 
Scalia •, Thomas 
Price v. Vincent
93
  X 
 Unanimous; Rehnquist ± 
Mitchell v. Esparza 
94
  X 
 Per Curiam 
Middleton v. McNeil 
95
  X 
 Per Curiam 
Yarborough v. Alvarado
96
  X 
Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, 
Breyer • 
Scalia, Rehnquist,  
Thomas, O’Connor •, 
Kennedy ± 
 
 87 530 U.S. 156 (2000). 
 88 532 U.S. 782 (2001). 
 89 537 U.S. 19 (2002). 
 90 537 U.S. 3 (2002). 
 91 535 U.S. 685 (2002). 
 92 539 U.S. 510 (2003). 
 93 538 U.S. 634 (2003). 
 94 540 U.S. 12 (2003). 
 95 541 U.S. 433 (2004). 
 96 541 U.S. 652 (2004). 
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Case Grant Deny Justices Favoring Grant Justices Favoring Denial 
Rompilla v. Beard
97
 X  
Stevens, Souter ±,  
Ginsburg, Breyer, 
O’Connor • 
Scalia, Rehnquist,  
Thomas, Kennedy • 
Bell v. Cone
98
  X 
 Per Curiam 
Brown v. Payton*
99
  X 
Souter •, Stevens, Gins-
burg 
Scalia •, Thomas, 
O’Connor, Kennedy ±, 
Breyer • 
Carey v. Musladin
100
  X 
 Unanimous; Thomas ± 
Uttecht v. Brown
101
  X 
Stevens •, Souter,  
Ginsburg, Breyer • 
Kennedy ±, Roberts,  
Scalia, Thomas, Alito 
Schriro v. Landrigan
102
  X 
Stevens •, Souter, Gins-
burg, Breyer 
Thomas ±, Roberts, Scalia, 
Kennedy, Alito 
Abdul-Kabir v. Quarter-
man
103
 
X  
Stevens ±, Souter, Gins-
burg, Breyer, Kennedy 
Roberts •, Scalia, Thomas, 
Alito 
Panetti v. Quarterman
104
 X  
Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, 
Breyer, Kennedy ± 
Roberts, Scalia, Thomas •, 
Alito 
Porter v. McCollum
105
 X  
Per Curiam  
Smith v. Spisak
106
  X 
 Unanimous; Breyer ±;  
Stevens • 
Lockyer v. Andrade**
107
  X 
Stevens, Souter •,  
Ginsburg, Breyer 
O’Connor ±, Rehnquist, 
Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas 
 
 97 545 U.S. 374 (2005). 
 98 543 U.S. 447 (2005). 
 99 544 U.S. 133 (2005). 
 100 549 U.S. 70 (2006). 
 101 551 U.S. 1 (2007). 
 102 550 U.S. 465 (2007). 
 103 550 U.S. 233 (2007). 
 104 551 U.S. 930 (2007). 
 105 130 S. Ct. 447 (2009). 
 106 130 S. Ct. 676 (2010). 
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*Chief Justice Rehnquist abstaining. 
**Not a capital case. 
 
A closer look at the data reveals why these initial inclinations are 
mistaken.  A justice-by-justice breakdown within the two respective 
blocs of justices is essential for a more accurate and honest analysis.  
On one end of the spectrum, Justices Scalia, Thomas, Rehnquist, Ro-
berts, and Alito have applied a standard of “blind deference.”  These 
Justices have only found the state court’s application of federal law to 
be “objectively unreasonable” in 4–14% of cases,
108
 which empirically 
demonstrates that the “blind deference” bloc has not applied the in-
dependent review required by the standard.  Although § 2254(d)(1) 
undoubtedly requires respect for state decisions, this was not in-
tended to come at the expense of the Supreme Court’s judgment and 
its expertise in federal law.
109
  Justices Souter, Stevens, Ginsburg, and 
Breyer have basically applied “de novo” review or some standard even 
less deferential.
110
  To say that state courts have applied federal law in 
an “objectively unreasonable” fashion 54–63% of the time is to disre-
gard the heightened respect for state decisions envisioned by the sta-
tute.  The numbers indicate that this group of justices is labeling as 
“objectively unreasonable” every state decision that it deems “incor-
rect,” which is in direct defiance of Williams.  Justices Kennedy and 
O’Connor fall in between the two blocs, sometimes aligning with the 
“blind deference” camp and sometimes aligning with the “de novo” 
camp. 
The statistics demonstrate conclusively that the conservative bloc 
of the Court is appropriately dubbed the “blind deference camp.”  
Out of the twenty-two cases in which Justice Scalia has applied § 
2254(d)(1) in a capital context, he found the state court’s application 
of federal law “objectively” unreasonable once (4%).
111
  Similarly, out 
of the twenty-two cases in which Justice Thomas has applied the pro-
vision, he, like Justice Scalia, has found the state court’s application 
to be “objectively unreasonable” once (4%).  In the fifteen cases in 
which Chief Justice Rehnquist has applied § 2254(d)(1) in a capital 
 
 107 538 U.S. 63 (2003). 
 108 See supra Table 1. 
 109 See supra notes 56, 57, and 59 and accompanying text. 
 110 Even with de novo review, appellate courts are generally cautious to overturn 
lower court decisions.  As the data indicates, however, the justices comprising the “de 
novo” camp find the state court’s application of federal law to be “objectively unrea-
sonable” 54–63% of the time.  Thus, it appears that the members of the Court in the 
“de novo” camp are not even showing the deference that might normally be attri-
buted to that standard of review. 
 111 The following statistics are derived from the data presented in Table 1. 
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context, he has found that the state court’s application of federal law 
was “objectively unreasonable” only once (6%).
112
  In the seven cases 
in which Chief Justice Roberts has considered the provision, he has 
joined the “blind deference” camp by finding that the state court’s 
application of federal law was “objectively unreasonable” once (14%).  
Likewise, Justice Alito has found that the state court’s application has 
been “objectively unreasonable” one time in the seven cases in which 
he has participated, (14%), which indicates that his replacement of 
Justice O’Connor will be an addition to the “blind deference” 
camp.
113
  Thus, justices in the “blind deference” camp have found a 
state court’s application of federal law “objectively unreasonable” in 
only 4–14% of cases since Williams.
114
 
One cannot appreciate the above results without comparing 
them with those of the “de novo” camp.  This camp, at various times, 
has been comprised of Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer.  
In the twenty-two cases in which Justice Stevens has applied § 
2254(d)(1) in a capital context, he has found the state court’s appli-
cation of federal law to be “objectively unreasonable” fourteen times 
(63%).  Justice Souter has found the state court’s application of fed-
eral law to be “objectively unreasonable” twelve out of twenty times 
(60%).  In the twenty-two cases in which Justice Ginsburg has applied 
the provision, she has found that the state court’s application of fed-
eral law was “objectively unreasonable” thirteen times (59%).  Follow-
ing the same trend, Justice Breyer has found that the state court’s ap-
plication of federal law was “objectively unreasonable” twelve out of 
twenty-two times (54%).
115
 
 
 112 See Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003). 
 113 See supra Table 1. 
 114 It should be noted that the one case in which Justices Roberts, Scalia, Thomas, 
and Alito found the state court’s application of federal law to be “objectively unrea-
sonable” was clearly an outlier with extraordinary circumstances.  In Porter v. McCol-
lum, 130 S. Ct. 447, 448 (2009), the state court had found petitioner Porter guilty of 
murder and sentenced him to death.  Subsequently, the Court held that the state de-
cision’s application of Strickland was objectively unreasonable; the state had con-
cluded that no prejudice resulted from petitioner’s counsel’s failure to introduce 
certain mitigating evidence.  Id. at 454.  The evidence not presented included Por-
ter’s status as a veteran who was decorated and wounded in two major engagements 
during the Korean War, the subsequent trauma he suffered, brain damage that made 
him inclined to behave violently,  and his abusive childhood.  Id. at 449.  Thus, Porter 
represents an outer fringe to the “blind deference” camp’s blind allegiance to state 
decisions—which was previously absent.  But this outer fringe, which only occurred 
once in the nine years following Williams, was largely driven by the extreme facts of a 
traumatized veteran and the Court’s compassion for his service.  
 115 Because Justice Sotomayor had only decided two cases as of the February 10, 
2010 cut off, this Comment has excluded her from its analysis.  See supra Table 1. 
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Justices Kennedy and O’Connor are the only justices whose 
numbers have aligned with the expectations of the standard.
116
  Out 
of the fifteen cases in which Justice O’Connor applied § 2254(d)(1) 
in a capital context, she has found the state court’s application of 
federal law to be “objectively unreasonable” four times (26%).  Simi-
larly, out of the twenty-two cases in which Justice Kennedy has consi-
dered the provision, he has found the state court’s decision on feder-
al law to be “objectively unreasonable” six times (27%).  Thus, these 
two justices find the state court’s application of the law reasonable 
most of the time, but on certain occasions, they decide that it is ap-
propriate for the Court to intervene. 
This seems to be exactly what the statute, and the standard of 
Williams, intended.117  In effect, their decisions have been the deci-
sions of the Court, because of the unwillingness of the two blocs of 
justices to move across the line.  Although their effort seems to have 
been the most genuine, the standard for “unreasonableness” that 
they have applied is undefined and leaves one to speculate as to how 
to harmonize seemingly irreconcilable results.  Thus, Williams has left 
a large analytical gap between the “de novo” and “blind deference” 
groups, which have not applied the standard at all; the only middle 
ground between the two camps has been occupied by the undefined 
and unpredictable analyses of Justices Kennedy and O’Connor.  The 
resulting uncertainty has led to the current state of the law—an arbi-
trary standard that fails to provide proper notice to potential peti-
tioners.  This standard has been particularly troublesome when con-
sidering that the stakes often involve the petitioner’s life.
118
 
The Justices who recently joined the Court will have an interest-
ing impact on the two camps and likely will make the arguments put 
forth in this Comment even more poignant.  The addition of Chief 
Justice Roberts will have virtually no impact because he seems to 
merely fill the void left by Justice Rehnquist in the “blind deference” 
camp.
119
  Justice O’Connor’s departure, however, has left a void in the 
middle of the Court that has been replaced with Justice Alito’s alle-
giance to the “blind deference” camp.
120
  The results of this shift can-
not be understated and will be discussed in more detail later in this 
 
 116 Presumably, the state courts’ application of federal law will usually, but not al-
ways, be “objectively reasonable.” 
 117 See supra Part II.B. 
 118 See infra Part V. 
 119 See supra Table 1. 
 120 See supra Table 1. 
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Comment.
121
  While the decisions were once swayed almost entirely by 
two justices attempting to apply a genuine but undefined standard, 
now the decisions are swayed by only one justice, Justice Kennedy.  
Furthermore, it is unclear how Justice Sotomayor’s replacement of 
Justice Souter will alter the balance of power between the two 
camps.
122
 
This is not simply an area where conservative and liberal justices 
disagree over how to apply a standard of review.  Rather, the two 
groups are blatantly using entirely different standards of review.  This 
split analysis has gone undetected because the present standard is 
undefined, and therefore the justices are in effect free to interpret 
“reasonableness” in a manner that accords with their ideologies.  Yet 
the flexibility (which has resulted in the two camps’ applying differ-
ent standards of review) is problematic for at least three reasons.  
First, as written, the statute is arbitrary because it has hinged on the 
opinions of two Justices, Kennedy and O’Connor, applying an unde-
fined version of the standard.  Second, because the Court has failed 
to establish the contours of “objectively unreasonable” with any sort 
of definitive test and has instead chosen to rely on its own inconsis-
tent precedent, the statute fails to provide proper notice to petition-
ers as to the level of review to which courts will subject their alleged 
federal law violations.  Finally, the unpredictability of the standard of 
review is dangerous in the capital context, where decisions determine 
whether a death sentence is upheld and carried out.  Therefore, 
when looked at retrospectively, § 2254(d)(1) has proven to be fatally 
flawed and in need of revision. 
B. Blind Deference, De Novo, and Something In Between 
The following two cases, selected from the empirical study 
above, are illustrative of the “blind deference” and “de novo” analys-
es.  Ramdass v. Angelone123 is a prototypical “blind deference” decision.  
The majority affirmed a denial of the writ and held that the state 
court did not unreasonably apply federal law when it failed to instruct 
the jury that defendant Ramdass was parole ineligible at his death 
 
 121 See infra Part V. 
 122 In the two cases in which Justice Sotomayor has participated, she voted to grant 
the writ in one case and deny the writ in the other.  See supra Table 1.   
 123 530 U.S. 156 (2000).  The decision was a five-to-four split, with Justice Kennedy 
authoring the majority opinion, joined by Justices Scalia, Rehnquist, and Thomas.  
Id. at 159.  Justice O’Connor filed a separate concurrence.  Id. at 178 (O’Connor, J., 
concurring).  Justice Stevens filed a dissent, in which Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and 
Breyer joined.  Id. at 182 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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sentencing.
124
  While Ramdass’s petition for the writ of habeas corpus 
was pending, the Supreme Court decided Simmons,
125
 which held that 
judges must inform juries when a defendant is parole ineligible un-
der state law at the time of the jury’s death penalty deliberations.
126
  
Ramdass argued that his case was indistinguishable from Simmons be-
cause a verdict in another matter involving Ramdass had made him 
parole ineligible.
127
  The majority, however, reasoned that because the 
“entry of judgment” had not yet been rendered in the other matter, 
Ramdass had not “conclusively established” that he was in fact parole 
ineligible, as required by Simmons.
128
 
By contrast, Justice Stevens’s dissent first noted “an acute unfair-
ness in permitting a State to rely on a recent conviction to establish a 
defendant’s future dangerousness while simultaneously permitting 
the State to deny that there was such a conviction when the defen-
dant attempts to argue that he is parole ineligible and therefore not a 
future danger.”
129
  Justice Stevens argued that the case was indistin-
guishable from, and “contrary to,” Simmons because even Simmons 
was not “conclusively” parole ineligible at the time of his sentencing 
as the parole board had not yet made its decision regarding Sim-
mons.
130
  Justice Stevens noted that even if the Court applied the cor-
rect law, “its application would be unreasonable” under the second 
test.
131
  The dissent provided persuasive evidence as to why the state’s 
distinction between convictions with an entry of judgment and those 
with merely a guilty verdict is unreasonable.
132
  The majority ignored 
the overwhelming evidence, noted by the dissent, that the case was 
indistinguishable from Simmons and blindly deferred to the state.  
This is a case where the conservative bloc’s utter refusal to find any 
state decision unreasonable is obvious. 
On the other side of the spectrum, Rompilla v. Beard
133
  provides a 
prototypical “de novo” camp analysis.  The Court reversed a denial of 
 
 124 Id. at 166. 
 125 Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154 (1994). 
 126 Id. at 156. 
 127 Ramdass, 530 U.S. at 166. 
 128 Id. at 167. 
 129 Id. at 182 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 130 Id. at 186. 
 131 Id. at 208. 
 132 Id. at 185–88. 
 133 545 U.S. 374 (2005).  The decision was five-to-four, with Justice Souter writing 
the majority opinion, joined by Justices Stevens, O’Connor, Ginsburg, and Breyer.  
Id. at 376.  Justice Kennedy’s dissent was joined by Justices Rehnquist, Scalia, and 
Thomas.  Id. at 396 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
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the writ and held that the state court’s application of the Strickland 
standard
134
 was objectively unreasonable.
135
  After being sentenced to 
death, Rompilla petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus in the district 
court, claiming inadequate representation.
136
  The Court agreed with 
the district court’s decision that the state court had unreasonably ap-
plied Strickland because Rompilla’s lawyers “had failed to investigate 
‘pretty obvious signs’ that Rompilla had a troubled childhood and 
suffered from mental illness and alcoholism, and instead had relied 
unjustifiably on Rompilla’s own description of an unexceptional 
background.”
137
  The majority reasoned that Rompilla’s counsel 
would have discovered this information if they examined the court 
file on one of Rompilla’s prior convictions.
138
  Yet the Court conceded 
that the lawyers did not ignore their obligation to find mitigating evi-
dence and acknowledged that they did explore other avenues to ob-
tain such evidence.
139
  The majority’s determination that the circuit 
court was “objectively unreasonable” in holding that counsel was effi-
cient did not apply the deference required by Strickland; the Court 
rested its opinion on the alleged “incorrectness” of the circuit court 
and not the “unreasonableness” of its decision. 
The dissent argued that “under any standard of review the inves-
tigation performed by Rompilla’s counsel in preparation for sentenc-
ing was not only adequate but also conscientious.”
140
  Particularly, 
considering “the Court’s recognition that the duty to investigate does 
not force defense lawyers to scour the globe on the off chance some-
thing will turn up” and that “reasonably diligent counsel may draw a 
line when they have good reason to think further investigation would 
be a waste,” counsel’s performance could not be considered deficient 
to such a degree that a state court’s judgment that it was sufficient 
would be “objectively unreasonable.”
141
  Furthermore, the dissent gave 
various compelling reasons for why the attorneys might not look to a 
previous case file for mitigating evidence.
142
 
 
 134 See supra note 44. 
 135 Rompilla, 545 U.S. at 388 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 136 Id. at 379. 
 137 Id. 
 138 Id. at 383–84. 
 139 Id. at 381. 
 140 Id. at 397. 
 141 Rompilla, 545 U.S. at 404. 
 142 Id. at 401 (“The majority . . . disregards the sound strategic calculation sup-
porting the decisions made by Rompilla’s attorneys.  Charles and Dantos [Rompilla’s 
counsel] were ‘aware of Rompilla’s priors’ and ‘aware of the circumstances’ sur-
rounding these convictions.  At the postconviction hearing, Dantos also indicated 
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 Rompilla is a perfect example of the “de novo” camp applying a 
completely different standard than the “blind deference” camp.  The 
majority engaged in an independent analysis and decided that if de-
fendant’s counsel looked though a prior case file, they would have 
found information that they eventually would have chosen to include 
as mitigating evidence.  The Court transformed what was arguably a 
wise tactic into an absolute requirement under Strickland, without any 
“clearly established” Supreme Court precedent instructing it to do so.  
Without such precedent, the Court’s finding—that the state court’s 
decision to respect strategic decisions by counsel was “objectively un-
reasonable”—is difficult to understand.  The Court’s analysis is even 
more striking when one considers that the Strickland standard is al-
ready deferential to the judgment of counsel
143
 and that the review of 
the state court’s application of that standard requires an “objectively 
unreasonable” decision regarding that standard.  As mentioned earli-
er, the Court apparently felt in its independent judgment that the 
counsel’s performance was in fact insufficient and made its judgment 
based on that belief.  The Court gave little, if any, deference to the 
state court’s application of this deferential law. 
An example of a genuine but puzzling attempt to apply AEDPA 
as written is Penry v. Johnson.
144
  The effort was genuine in that the ma-
jority reached different results on different claims within the same set 
of facts.  The decision was puzzling, however, because the Court re-
fused to define the standard of “reasonableness” with respect to ei-
ther claim.  In Penry, petitioner Penry was convicted of rape and 
murder, and sentenced to death.
145
  The majority considered his two 
claims separately.  In Part III.A, the Court affirmed the Texas Court 
of Criminal Appeals’ rejection of Penry’s Fifth Amendment claim.
146
  
In Part III.B, the Court explained that Penry also contended that the 
jury instructions given at his second sentencing hearing did not fol-
 
that she had reviewed the documents relating to the prior conviction.  Based on this 
information, as well as their numerous conversations with Rompilla and his family, 
Charles and Dantos reasonably could conclude that reviewing the full prior convic-
tion case file was not the best allocation of resources.”). 
 143 See supra note 44. 
 144 532 U.S. 782 (2001).  Justice O’Connor delivered the opinion of the Court, 
Parts I, II, and III.A of which were unanimous.  III.B was joined by Justices Stevens, 
Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer.  Justice Thomas filed an opinion concurring 
in part and dissenting in part, in which Justices Rehnquist and Scalia joined. 
 145 Id. at 786. 
 146 Id. at 795 (“We therefore cannot say that it was objectively unreasonable for the 
Texas court to conclude that Penry is not entitled to relief on his Fifth Amendment 
claim.”). 
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low Penry I
147
 because the instructions did not allow the jury to express 
“its reasoned moral response to the mitigating evidence of Penry’s 
mental retardation and childhood abuse.”
148
  The Court found that, 
under the instructions as given, “a reasonable juror could well have 
believed that there was no vehicle for expressing the view that Penry 
did not deserve to be sentenced to death based upon his mitigating 
evidence.”
149
  Thus, the state court’s decision that the jury instructions 
provided at Penry’s second sentencing hearing satisfied Penry I was 
objectively unreasonable.
150
  Therefore, while “blind deference” jus-
tices gave their usual flat out rejection of the writ, the majority en-
gaged in a genuine attempt to apply the statute and came to different 
results with regard to different claims within the same case. 
V. THE PROBLEMS PRESENTED BY THE COURT’S SPLIT ANALYSIS 
With the background information in proper context, it is neces-
sary to discern why the stark divide over the standard of review in § 
2254(d)(1) is so problematic.  The Court’s decisions since Williams 
have raised three critical issues.  First, because of the unrelenting 
stubbornness of both camps, the fact that most decisions have been 
five to four and that most decisions have hinged solely on Justices 
Kennedy’s and O’Connor’s (undefined) analyses, the results are arbi-
trary.  Second, the cases fail to treat similar situations similarly and 
thus do not provide proper notice to potential petitioners of the de-
gree of evidence required to succeed on habeas claims.  Third, be-
cause cases in the capital punishment context are literally life or 
death decisions, this is hardly the area of law to have ambiguity.  
These issues are serious and demand a resolution. 
A. Arbitrariness 
As noted earlier, most of the relevant decisions applying § 
2254(d)(1) in the capital punishment context are decided five to 
four.  Given that the “blind deference” and “de novo” camps are 
fixed, the split decisions are strong evidence that the opinions have 
almost entirely hinged on Justices Kennedy and O’Connor.  Yet be-
 
 147 Penry v. Lynaugh (Penry I), 492 U.S. 302, 327–28 (1989) (“In order to ensure 
‘reliability in the determination that death is the appropriate punishment in a specif-
ic case,’ the jury must be able to consider and give effect to any mitigating evidence 
relevant to a defendant’s background and character or the circumstances of the 
crime.”).   
 148 Penry, 532 U.S. at 796. 
 149 Id. 
 150 Id. at 797. 
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cause even these two Justices have applied an undefined—albeit 
more genuine—interpretation of the statute, the results have been 
inconsistent. This point is best demonstrated by comparing some of 
the five-to-four analyses that depended solely on Justice Kennedy’s or 
Justice O’Connor’s addition to one of the predetermined groups.  
These cases illustrate that in the absence of some explanation of what 
standard the two Justices have been applying, we cannot be certain 
that these cases were not decided merely at the whim of two individu-
als.  The replacement of Justice O’Connor with Justice Alito—who 
has fallen squarely into the “blind deference” camp in the seven deci-
sions in which he has taken part—has further magnified this point.
151
  
Thus, instead of the whim of two individuals, who could at least po-
tentially balance against one another, future § 2254(d)(1) cases in 
the capital context may rest solely on Justice Kennedy’s unspecified 
analysis. 
The arbitrariness of the provision is a simple but important is-
sue.  Because the two camps are fixed and neither Justice O’Connor’s 
nor Justice Kennedy’s standards have any definite contours, the 
Court’s decisions in this area have been, at the very best, unpredicta-
ble and, at worst random.  As the following discussion will demon-
strate, Justices Kennedy and O’Connor have authored opinions of 
both the “de novo” and “blind deference” camps at various times.  
For example, in Yarborough v. Alvarado, the Court denied the writ of 
habeas corpus and held that the state court’s decision—that the se-
venteen-year-old defendant was not “in custody” when he was brought 
to the police station and questioned without counsel and without a 
reading of his Miranda rights—was not objectively unreasonable.152  In 
this decision, Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion aligned with the 
“blind deference” camp to sway the balance in its favor.  Sounding 
extremely deferential, Justice Kennedy stated that “fair-minded jurists 
could disagree over whether Alvarado was in custody.”
153
  Justice Ken-
nedy continued, reasoning that “[w]e cannot grant relief under 
AEDPA by conducting our own independent inquiry into whether 
the state court was correct as a de novo matter.”
154
  Therefore, in this 
case, Justice Kennedy disclaimed the ability to conduct an “indepen-
 
 151 See discussion supra Part IV.A. 
 152 541 U.S. 652, 665 (2004).  The decision was five to four with Justice Kennedy 
writing the majority opinion, joined by Justices Rehnquist, Scalia, O’Connor, and 
Thomas.  Id. at 655.  Justice Breyer filed the dissent, joined by Justices Stevens, Sou-
ter, and Ginsburg.  Id. at 669 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 153 Id. at 664 (majority opinion). 
 154 Id. at 665. 
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dent inquiry” and contended that while the state court’s application 
may have been wrong, it was not unreasonable.
155
 
Justice O’Connor has aligned with the “blind deference” camp 
in many cases as well.  Most notably, she authored the opinion joined 
by the “blind deference” members in Lockyer v. Andrade.
156
  In this 
case, the majority found that the Ninth Circuit erred in ruling that 
the state court’s decision—sentencing petitioner to two consecutive 
terms of twenty-five years to life in prison for a “third strike” convic-
tion—was an unreasonable application of the clearly established fed-
eral law.
157
  The Court stated that the precedents were unclear in this 
area but ultimately concluded that “a gross disproportionality prin-
ciple is applicable to sentences for terms of years.”
158
  In Lockyer, the 
state court found petitioner guilty of violating California’s “three 
strike” law.
159
  On two occasions, petitioner stole videotapes totaling 
about $150—which the prosecutor discretionarily charged as felonies 
and not misdemeanors—and this triggered the law because he had a 
prior misdemeanor.
160
  Hiding behind what she deemed an “unclear” 
precedent, Justice O’Connor expressed reservations about overturn-
ing the state court’s judgment and ultimately concluded that the 
grossly disproportionate principle only applied to “extraordinary” 
cases.
161
  But if fifty years to life in prison for stealing $150 of video-
tapes is not sufficiently “extraordinary,” then one has difficulty imag-
ing a scenario that would be.  In truth, Justice O’Connor was the 
speaker for the “blind deference” camp in this opinion by refusing to 
question a patently unjust state application of federal law. 
In other cases, Justices Kennedy and O’Connor align with the 
“de novo” camp, and their decisions fail to elaborate on the prin-
ciples they used to justify such a radical shift.  For example, Justice 
Kennedy joined the “de novo” camp when he wrote the opinion in 
 
 155 Id. 
 156 538 U.S. 63 (2003).  The decision was five to four, with Justice O’Connor au-
thoring the majority, joined by Justices Rehnquist, Scalia, Kennedy and Thomas.  Id. 
at 66.  Justice Souter filed a dissent, in which Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer 
joined.  Id. at 77 (Souter, J., dissenting).  As noted earlier, this case did not involve a 
capital sentence; its reasoning, however, has proved to be influential in capital cases.  
See, e.g., Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 953 (2007); Brown v. Payton, 544 U.S. 
133, 147 (2005); Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 661, 666 (2004); Mitchell v. 
Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 18 (2003); Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 520 (2003). 
 157 Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 77. 
 158 Id. at 72. 
 159 Id. at 67–68. 
 160 Id. at 67. 
 161 Id. at 77. 
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Pannetti v. Quarterman, which reversed a denial of the writ of habeas 
corpus.
162
  In Pannetti, the majority held that the state court’s applica-
tion of federal law was objectively unreasonable when it determined 
that petitioner was competent to be executed.
163
  The state courts and 
court-appointed experts determined that petitioner was competent to 
be executed.
164
  Yet the Court disregarded these findings and, draw-
ing conclusions of its own from the record that petitioner’s condition 
was “worsening,” concluded that petitioner was not competent.
165
  
This reasoning directly conflicts with Yarborough, in which Kennedy 
stated that the Court could not conduct its “own independent inquiry 
into whether the state court was correct . . . .”
166
 
Similarly, Justice O’Connor has written opinions demonstrative 
of the de novo camp.  In Penry, she authored the majority opinion, 
which was joined unanimously as to the part that denied the writ, but 
only by the de novo camp (plus Justice Kennedy) as to the portion of 
the opinion that granted the writ.
167
  As noted earlier, this case alle-
gedly involved a defective jury instruction, and the Court held that 
the addition of a “supplemental instruction” was insufficient to meet 
the standard of Penry I.
168
  Because of this, Justice O’Connor and the 
“de novo” camp, found the state decision to be an “objectively unrea-
sonable” application of federal law.
169
  Therefore, Justices Kennedy 
and O’Connor demonstrated willingness to join either the “de novo” 
or “blind deference” camps without any particular principle explain-
ing why they joined one camp or the other.
170
 
The particular issue is not that Justices Kennedy and O’Connor 
have aligned with one camp or another; the problem is that they do 
so without definition or explanation or even an acknowledgment that 
they are doing so.  If they are measuring reasonableness by some test, 
 
 162 551 U.S. 930, 934 (2007).  The decision was five to four.  Justice Kennedy deli-
vered the opinion of the Court, in which Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and 
Breyer joined.  Id. at 934.  Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justic-
es Roberts, Scalia, and Alito joined.  Id. at 962 (Thomas, J. dissenting). 
 163 Id. at 954 (majority opinion). 
 164 Id. 
 165 Id. at 937 
 166 Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 665 (2004) 
 167 Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782 (2001). 
 168 See supra notes 144–50 and accompanying text. 
 169 See supra notes 144–50 and accompanying text. 
 170 The cases above were selected because Justices O’Connor and Kennedy actual-
ly wrote the opinions of the “blind deference” camp or the “de novo” camp.  There 
are many more decisions—in fact, most of the decisions—where their alliance with 
one group or the other swayed the decision.  See supra Table 1. 
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they should transfer that test from the contours of their imagination 
into the opinions that comprise the law.  The Court’s decisions have 
shown that an undefined standard of “reasonableness” has not suf-
ficed to lead to the predictable results required by the law.  Instead, it 
has allowed wiggle room for “blind deference” and “de novo” Justices 
to carve out their own standards.  When the standards amount to po-
lar-opposite analyses, the law is unworkable and in need of revision. 
B. Notice 
Section 2254(d)(1) is also troublesome because it does not treat 
similar situations similarly.  This is the zenith of injustice, and the 
concern is only magnified by the life or death consequences present 
in the capital punishment context.  In situations where de novo re-
view applies, the petitioner obviously has a much better chance of 
having the writ granted and hence living.  By contrast, where “blind 
deference” applies, the petitioner is virtually assured of being denied 
the writ and hence executed.  The inconsistencies within the Court 
regarding the standard of “objective reasonableness” fail to provide 
the proper notice to petitioners as to the level of “incorrectness” re-
quired for a court to grant a writ of habeas corpus. 
This point is evident when comparing the similar facts in Rompil-
la171 and Schriro v. Landrigan
172
 that led to opposite results.  As noted 
earlier, Rompilla held that the state court’s decision that defendant’s 
counsel were not ineffective was “objectively unreasonable.”
173
  The 
Court’s Rompilla decision was the prototype “de novo” case, where the 
Court reasoned that defendant’s counsels were “unreasonable” be-
cause they did not research the case file on one of defendant’s prior 
crimes that would have led to mitigating evidence that might have 
avoided a death sentence, even though substantial evidence indicated 
that counsel did make an investigation into other sources.
174
  By con-
trast, only two years after the Rompilla decision the Schriro Court re-
versed a grant of the writ and held that counsel was not ineffective 
under the Strickland standard
175
 when he failed to investigate further 
 
 171 Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374 (2005).  See supra notes 133–43143 and ac-
companying text. 
 172 550 U.S. 465 (2007).  The decision was five to four, with Justice Thomas deli-
vering the opinion of the Court, joined by Justices Roberts, Scalia, Kennedy, and Ali-
to.  Id. at 468.  Justice Stevens filed a dissent, joined by Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and 
Breyer.  Id. at 482 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 173 Rompilla, 545 U.S. at 388; see also supra notes 135–39 and accompanying text. 
 174 Rompilla, 545 U.S. at 383–84; see also supra notes 135–39 and accompanying 
text. 
 175 See supra note 44. 
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sources of mitigating evidence at defendant’s request.
176
  In Schriro, 
counsel interviewed defendant’s relatives but did not search into oth-
er sources that would have evidenced his troubled background.
177
  
The majority reasoned that “at the time of the Arizona postconviction 
court’s decision, it was not objectively unreasonable for that court to 
conclude that a defendant who refused to allow the presentation of 
any mitigating evidence could not establish Strickland prejudice based 
on his counsel’s failure to investigate further possible mitigating evi-
dence.”
178
 
These decisions are irreconcilable.  If the same standard had 
been applied the results would have been the same; indeed, with re-
spect to the result, every Justice ruled the same in Schriro as he or she 
did in Rompilla.  The only difference between these cases is that Jus-
tice Alito had replaced Justice O’Connor upon her retirement, and 
his addition to the Court swayed the analysis in favor of the “blind de-
ference” camp in Schriro, which came later.  When defendants cannot 
be sure which standard, “blind deference” or “de novo,” will be ap-
plied to essentially identical facts, the law fails to provide proper no-
tice to petitioners.  The Court’s decision on these issues—life-or-
death issues—should not be dictated by which ideological camp the 
Justices choose.  Instead, these decisions should be dictated by the 
law, with all of the justices applying the same standard, even if they 
disagree as to how the facts apply to the agreed-upon standard. 
C. Life-or-Death Results 
The Court has often stressed the necessity of ensuring correct 
results in the capital punishment context.  For instance, in Dobbs v. 
Zant,179 the Court noted that it had “emphasized before the impor-
tance of reviewing capital sentences on a complete record.”
180
  Agree-
ing with this notion, Justice Marshall’s dissent in Barefoot v. Estelle 
stated that “time and again the Court has condemned procedures in 
capital cases that might be completely acceptable in an ordinary 
 
 176 Schriro, 550 U.S. at 472. 
 177 Id. at 469, 471. 
 178 Id. at 478. 
 179 506 U.S. 357 (1993). 
 180 Id. at 358.  Petitioner, who was convicted of murder and sentenced to death, 
alleged that his counsel was ineffective.  Id. at 358.  The State represented that a copy 
of the transcript of the closing arguments at the sentencing phase was unavailable 
and relied solely on the counsel’s testimony.  Id.  Petitioner subsequently located the 
transcript which directly contradicted the counsel’s testimony.  Id.  The Supreme 
Court held that the Eleventh Circuit erred in its conclusion that the record could not 
be reconsidered.  Id. 
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case.”
181
  The Court in Woodson v. North Carolina urged something sim-
ilar: 
[T]he penalty of death is qualitatively different from a sentence of 
imprisonment, however long.  Death, in its finality, differs more 
from life imprisonment than a 100-year prison term differs from 
one of only a year or two.  Because of that qualitative difference, 
there is a corresponding difference in the need for reliability in 
the determination that death is the appropriate punishment in a 
specific case.
182
 
As the Court has rightly recognized, the consequences of decisions in 
this context are indeed severe.  Of relevance to this Comment, when 
the Court affirms a denial of the writ or reverses a grant of the writ, it 
is essentially permitting the previous execution sentence to proceed.  
Therefore, these decisions ultimately can lead to the death of human 
beings. 
The Court’s recognition of capital punishment’s finality renders 
the uncertainty of the § 2254(d)(1) “reasonableness” test for habeas 
review troubling.  After thirteen years of courts applying a standard 
that has received steady criticism for its ambiguity and inconsistency, 
neither Congress nor the Court has attempted to establish clearer 
guidelines for the habeas review of federal law claims under § 
2254(d)(1).  Ultimately, Congress has the most power to change the 
law in this respect by amending the Act.  Even so, the Court—
whether or not it would like to admit it—also has the power to modify 
the standard to reach a clearer and fairer results.  In Casey v. Planned 
Parenthood, Justice O’Connor established considerations for the Court 
to weigh when deciding whether to overrule one of its precedents
183
—
which in this case would be Williams.  She noted that in evaluating an 
existing law, “we may ask whether the rule has proven to be intolera-
ble simply in defying practical workability.”
184
  Analyzing the results of 
the Williams interpretation of § 2254(d)(1) and its split standard de-
monstrates that this law, in its undefined present state, is unworkable 
and in need of alteration. 
 
 181 463 U.S. 880, 913 (1983) (Marshall, J., dissenting). The majority held that evi-
dence presented by two psychiatrists regarding petitioner’s future dangerousness, 
which ultimately contributed to the petitioner’s death sentence, was not barred by 
the Constitution.  Id. at 896 (majority opinion).  The psychiatrists had never eva-
luated petitioner personally.  Id. at 917.  (Blackmun, J., dissenting).  
 182 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976).  The Court invalidated a North Carolina statute that 
imposed a mandatory death sentence and held that a court must be allowed to con-
sider the character and record of the defendant in its decision.  Id. 
 183 505 U.S. 833, 854 (1992). 
 184 Id. 
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Brown v. Payton demonstrates the precise problem of allowing 
incorrect applications of federal law to stand in AEDPA cases.
185
  In 
Brown, the Court reversed a grant of the writ of habeas corpus and 
held that the state court did not unreasonably apply federal law when 
it concluded that a jury instruction did not have to take count of de-
fendant’s post-crime religious conversion.
186
  With regard to jury in-
structions, the judge directed—in accordance with factor (k)
187
—that 
jurors consider “any other circumstance which extenuates the gravity 
of the crime even though it is not a legal excuse for the crime.”
188
  De-
fense counsel requested that the court alter the instruction to make 
explicit the jury’s obligation to evaluate the evidence of the defen-
dant’s character, including his religious conversion.
189
  The state court 
refused to alter the instruction.
190
  The Court did not think that the 
California Supreme Court’s determination—that factor (k) was suffi-
ciently broad to encompass petitioner’s concerns—was unreasona-
ble.
191
  The majority ruled that, “[e]ven on the assumption that [the 
California Supreme Court’s] conclusion was incorrect, it was not un-
reasonable, and is therefore just the type of decision that AEDPA 
shields on habeas review.”
192
 
The Brown analysis provides another clear example of the prob-
lem with the current application of § 2254(d)(1) in a capital context.  
The majority hides behind the cloak of its “wrong-but-reasonable” 
analysis, which Congress explicitly rejected as a possible interpreta-
tion of the provision,
193
 and signals its approval of the execution of a 
man that concededly might have been convicted in violation of his 
constitutional rights.  As Justice Breyer noted in concurrence, “[T]his 
 
 185 544 U.S. 133 (2005).  The decision was five to three, with Justice Kennedy au-
thoring the majority opinion, joined by Justices Breyer, O’Connor, Scalia, and Tho-
mas.  Id. at 135.  Justice Scalia filed a concurring opinion, joined by Thomas.  Id. at 
147 (Scalia, J., concurring).  Justice Breyer also filed a concurring opinion.  Id. at 148 
(Breyer, J., concurring).  Justice Souter filed a dissenting opinion, joined by Stevens 
and Ginsburg.  Id. at 149 (Souter, J., dissenting).  Chief Justice Rehnquist did not 
take part in the decision.  Id. at 147. 
 186 Id. at 143 (majority opinion). 
 187 “Factor (k) was a catchall instruction, in contrast to the greater specificity of 
the instructions that preceded it. As set forth in the statute, and as explained to the 
jury, it directed jurors to consider ‘[a]ny other circumstance which extenuates the 
gravity of the crime even though it is not a legal excuse for the crime.’”  Id. at 137. 
 188 Id. at 164. 
 189 Id. at 137. 
 190 Id. at 153. 
 191 Brown, 544 U.S. at 142. 
 192 Id. at 143. 
 193 See supra Part II.B. 
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is a case in which Congress’ instruction to defer to the reasonable 
conclusions of state-court judges makes a critical difference.  Were I a 
California state judge, I would likely hold that Payton’s penalty-phase 
proceedings violated the 8th Amendment.”
194
  As a five-to-three deci-
sion, if Justice Breyer had been able to rule that the application of 
federal law was incorrect, as he admitted it was, the result would have 
been different.
195
  Because his hands were tied by the procedural 
thicket of AEDPA and Williams, Breyer was in effect “forced” to deny 
the writ, which ended up resulting in an affirmed death sentence of 
petitioner.  The U.S. Supreme Court is the ultimate arbiter of federal 
law, not the state courts.  If the Court finds a mistake regarding fed-
eral law, as there was in this case, the Court’s job to remedy that er-
ror. 
VI. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS 
A complete analysis of § 2254(d)(1) requires an evaluation of 
potential solutions to the problems created by the Court’s split inter-
pretation.  There are primarily two potential solutions to the issues 
posed by the current standard.  First, the Court could identify criteria 
by which to evaluate the “reasonableness” of the state court’s applica-
tion of federal law.  When one group of Justices says that the state 
court is almost never “unreasonable” and another says that the state 
court is “unreasonable” up to 63 % of the time, the standard is any-
thing but “objective.”  Other areas of the law have demonstrated that 
defining “reasonableness” is possible.  For instance, in tort law judges 
frequently evaluate reasonableness by using the “Hand Formula.”  
Under this equation, an individual is negligent when the burden of 
adequate care is less than the combination of the probability of the 
harm and gravity of the harm.
196
  Yet the Hand formula evaluates the 
reasonableness of conduct, which is conceptually easier to under-
stand than the reasonableness of a court’s application of law. 
In the current context, “reasonableness” is not so easily defina-
ble.  The line between incorrect and unreasonable state court deci-
sions is especially elusive.  Perhaps the Court could apply a test simi-
lar to the one used to evaluate “plain error” in criminal and civil jury 
 
 194 Brown, 544 U.S. at 148 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 195 Since the Eighth Circuit granted the writ, if Justice Breyer voted to affirm this 
decision the Court would have been split four to four.  As such, the default rule is to 
revert to the circuit court’s decision, which granted petitioner the writ of habeas cor-
pus.  See, e.g., Jensen v. Quaring, 472 U.S. 478, 478 (1985) (“The judgment is af-
firmed by an equally divided Court.”). 
 196 United States v. Carroll Towing, 159 F.2d 169, 173 (1947).   
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instructions.  Johnson v. United States identified four factors for courts 
to consider in determining whether plain-error review is appropriate: 
[B]efore an appellate court can correct an error not raised at tri-
al, there must be (1) an “error,” (2) that is “plain,” and (3) that 
“affects substantial rights.”  If all three conditions are met, an ap-
pellate court may then exercise its discretion to notice a forfeited 
error, but only if (4) the error “seriously affects the fairness, inte-
grity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.”
197
 
Using a test similar to this, the Court would first evaluate whether an 
error exists at all in the state court’s application of federal law.  If an 
error exists, the Court would then determine whether the error is suf-
ficiently obvious.  Because the cases involve constitutional protections 
that determine whether petitioners are sentenced to death, the third 
factor, related to the effect on substantial rights, will always be met in 
the capital context.  Finally, an error in cases of this magnitude would 
surely affect the “fairness, integrity, and public reputation of judicial 
proceedings.”  This test, however, creates more questions than an-
swers.  The most critical issue would be how to evaluate whether an 
error is “plain.”  This just seems to be another way of asking if the er-
ror was “unreasonable,” which is precisely the question the test would 
be set out to answer.  In sum, this test would not be very helpful, and 
it is difficult to conceive of other tests that would be. 
As a second possibility, the standard could be overruled entire-
ly—in light of the results it has produced—resulting in a reversion 
back to a de novo standard.  This de-novo standard would apply only 
to capital cases because of the magnitude of the penalty.  State-court 
factual determinations would still be treated with deference.  After 
all, state courts are in the best position to evaluate the facts because 
they hear testimony and have juries to evaluate credibility.  With re-
gard to application of federal law, however, the federal courts, and 
the Supreme Court in particular, are in the best position to evaluate 
accuracy.  The balancing of harms—between, on the one hand, res-
pecting state courts and preventing abuse of the habeas process, and, 
on the other hand, reaching accurate results when the penalty is 
death on the other—clearly favors de novo review.  In addition, be-
cause half of the Supreme Court is already effectually applying de no-
vo review anyway, the alteration would encourage consistency. 
Further, the repeal of § 2254(d)(1) in the capital-punishment 
context is a logical solution because the original justifications for the 
 
 197 520 U.S. 461, 467 (1997). 
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restrictive standard have been undermined.
198
  First, the notion that 
courts need to guard against an influx of habeas petitions is un-
founded.
199
  While “the number of habeas petitions has increased,” 
the percentage of prisoners filing habeas petitions has not.
200
  In addi-
tion, the notion that prisoners facing capital sentences are particular-
ly likely to use the habeas system to delay their punishment has been 
refuted.  If this were the case, the percentage of habeas petitions filed 
would be lower in states that have abolished the death penalty.
201
  Yet 
“five of the fourteen non-death penalty states, or thirty-five percent, 
had rates of habeas filings above the national average.”
202
  Thus, peti-
tioners have not especially abused the habeas system in the capital-
punishment context.  Accordingly, repealing AEDPA would be fair 
and likely would not negatively impact judicial efficiency or promote 
abuse of the habeas system. 
Furthermore, overruling AEDPA and instead instituting de-novo 
review would allow the Court to perform its constitutional obligation 
to pronounce the law.  In her article, Saying What the Law Is, District 
Judge Lynn Adelman identified the problems with the current “un-
reasonableness” standard: 
[I]n order to grant habeas relief under AEDPA, the federal court 
must find the state court decision under consideration not only 
wrong, but unsupportable.  The standard thus requires prisoners 
who have been convicted in violation of the Constitution to re-
main in prison.  In addition, it does not require federal courts to 
determine whether state court decisions are correct or incorrect, 
or even to say what the law is.
203
 
As Judge Adelman went on to explain, if “courts refrain from criticiz-
ing decisions hostile to constitutional rights, the result will be a de-
cline in the level of our constitutional protections (as well as fewer 
conflicts for the Supreme Court to resolve, should the Court choose 
to resolve them).”
204
  In Judge Adelman’s identification of the prob-
lem, the solution becomes apparent.  If the Court is able to evaluate 
federal legal claims de novo, it can overturn state decisions that apply 
 
 198 David Blumberg, Habeas Leaps From the Pan and Into the Fire: Jacobs v. Scott and 
the AntiTerrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 61 ALB. L. REV. 557, 577 (1997).   
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 203 Lynn Adelman & Jon Deitrich, Saying What the Law Is: How Certain Legal Doc-
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federal law incorrectly.  This will ensure that constitutional protec-
tions remain intact and that the Court maintains its role as the arbiter 
of federal law.  Furthermore, allowing federal judges to “say what the 
law is” will enable courts to establish a law that provides proper notice 
and is not arbitrary.  These characteristics are especially crucial in the 
capital punishment context. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The objective data since Williams v. Taylor demonstrate a split 
standard when it comes to federal habeas review of claims adjudi-
cated on the merits at the state level.  Furthermore, even aside from 
the issues addressed in this Comment, federal judges have noted that 
AEDPA is generally flawed.  For example, a recent New York Times ar-
ticle noted the disdain that many of these judges have for AEDPA’s 
stringent provisions.
205
  The article explained that “in dozens of capi-
tal cases in recent years, appeals court judges, some of whom have 
ruled in favor of the death penalty many times, have complained that 
Congress and the Supreme Court have raised daunting barriers for 
death row prisoners to appeal their convictions.”
206
  Further evidence 
of the displeasure of federal judges is demonstrated by the fact that 
“[s]ince its passage, the act has been cited in a half-dozen to two doz-
en dissents a year.”
207
 
With respect to § 2254(d)(1), the “objective unreasonableness” 
standard was a drastic departure from the preexisting habeas law.  
Prior to the adoption of AEDPA, federal courts applied de-novo re-
view to state courts’ application of federal law.  Then, in the wake of 
the Oklahoma City bombing, Congress passed AEDPA to reduce de-
lays in the habeas system and ensure respect for state-court sentences.  
Yet even when Congress debated AEDPA, both critics and supporters 
expressed reservations about the possibility of a “wrong-but-
reasonable” interpretation, which would allow incorrect state-court 
interpretations to stand as long as they were reasonable.  These fears 
were eventually realized in future Supreme Court cases that were the 
focus of this Comment. 
In the wake of AEDPA, federal courts disagreed over how to ap-
ply the “contrary to” and “unreasonable application” language of the 
statute.  Eventually, Williams v. Taylor provided that the language es-
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tablished two different tests.  While the “contrary to” prong has been 
largely uncontroversial, the “unreasonable application” test has been 
extremely troublesome.  As the years passed, the Williams Court ex-
plicitly adopted the “wrong-but-reasonable” approach, against which 
Congress fought prior to AEDPA’s adoption.  While appearing to be 
a unified “reasonableness” standard, not unlike in other areas of law, 
the standard with respect to § 2254(d)(1) proved to be elusive as ap-
plied in the cases following Williams. 
Since Williams, the Court has split into two blocs and applied two 
entirely different standards of “reasonableness” depending on the 
members of the Court who represent the majority.  The “blind defe-
rence” camp has read “unreasonable application” to mean that fed-
eral courts must simply defer to the state-court’s application of feder-
al law.  This is evidenced by the fact that this group of justices has 
found the state-court application of federal law to be unreasonable in 
only 4–14% of the cases since Williams.  On the other hand, the “de 
novo” camp has engaged in analysis even more stringent than that 
expected of traditional de novo review.  Since 2000, this group of jus-
tices has found the state-court’s application of federal law “objectively 
unreasonable” most of the time.  This evidence indicates not merely a 
disagreement over how to apply the standard, but the use of two dif-
ferent standards. 
Somewhere in the middle and vacillating between the two blocs, 
Justices Kennedy and O’Connor have been the crucial swing votes in 
this area.  While their numbers have aligned with the expectations of 
the statute, the exact contours of the standards they have applied are 
unclear.  Specifically, they failed to set forth the principles they used 
to justify aligning with the “blind deference” bloc in some cases and 
the “de novo” reasoning in others.  Yet the real problem with the ana-
lyses of the two justices is that their standard—while admittedly more 
honest—remains undefined.  Further, with Justice O’Connor’s re-
placement by Justice Alito, Justice Kennedy is the sole justice standing 
between the two camps.  This may make future § 2254(d)(1) cases 
even more unpredictable than they have been since Williams. 
When studied retrospectively, the data suggests three major is-
sues with the Court’s cases since Williams.  First, the cases have proven 
that the standard, as it exists, is arbitrary.  Many cases are decided five 
to four, and the results often hinge on which camp Justices Kennedy 
or O’Connor aligned with on a particular day—with no reasoning or 
indication of how they might align prior to the decision due to their 
undefined standard.  Second, the cases have failed to provide notice 
to potential petitioners as to the degree of incorrectness that the state 
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court must have exhibited with regard to their constitutional rights.  
Because Justices O’Connor and Kennedy both wrote opinions ex-
pressing “blind deference” and “de novo” sentiments and because 
their opinions swayed the Court, the results have been, at best, un-
predictable, and, at worst, random.  Finally, this area is particularly 
sensitive because of the Court’s traditional recognition of capital pu-
nishment as an area where accuracy is of utmost priority. 
These results indicate that AEDPA and its standard of “reasona-
bleness” have failed.  While lawmakers could try to come up with a 
way to define “reasonableness” in a way that provides more predicta-
bility, the most logical solution is to change the standard for death 
penalty cases back to the de novo review that existed before AEDPA’s 
enactment.  This would allow the Court to correct concededly incor-
rect interpretations of federal law and would further provide the 
Court with the flexibility to perform its constitutional function of de-
fining the law.  The de-novo standard is particularly meritorious be-
cause the original justifications for abolishing it have proven unwar-
ranted.  Because history has demonstrated that the standard of 
“objective unreasonableness” is unworkable, lawmakers should reins-
titute the de novo standard of review for state court applications of 
federal law. 
 
